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Abstract 
 
In the television show Affari Tuoi an individual faces a sequence of binary choices 
between a risky lottery with equiprobable prizes of up to half a million euros and a 
monetary amount for certain. The decisions of 114 show participants are used to test the 
predictions of ten decision theories: risk neutrality, expected utility theory, fanning-out 
hypothesis (weighted utility theory, transitive skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory), 
(cumulative) prospect theory, regret theory, rank-dependent expected utility theory, 
Yaari’s dual model, prospective reference theory and disappointment aversion theory. 
Assumptions of risk neutrality and loss aversion are clearly violated, respectively, by 
55% and 46% of all contestants. There appears to be no evidence of nonlinear probability 
weighting or disappointment aversion. Observed decisions are generally consistent with 
the assumption of regret aversion and there is strong evidence for the fanning-out 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, we find no behavioral patterns that cannot be reconciled within 
the expected utility framework (or prospective reference theory that gives identical 
predictions). 
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Testing the Predictions of Decision Theories in a Natural 
Experiment When Half a Million Is at Stake 
1. Introduction 
Well-known violations of expected utility theory such as the Allais paradox (e.g. 
Allais, 1953) motivated the development of numerous generalized non-expected utility 
theories (e.g. Starmer, 2000). The merits of these decision theories were largely assessed 
according to their goodness of fit to the behavioral patterns observed in the laboratory 
experiments (e.g. Harless and Camerer, 1994; Hey and Orme, 1994). In this paper we test 
the predictions of ten decisions theories in a natural experiment with a more 
representative subject pool (drawn from the adult population of Italy) and significantly 
higher monetary incentives (prizes of up to half a million euros) than in conventional 
laboratory experiments. 
In the television show Affari Tuoi (Italian version of Deal or No Deal), contestants 
make several choices between a risky lottery and an amount for certain. Risky lotteries, 
which contestants face in the show, are determined by chance events. This allows us to 
divide contestants across randomized treatments. Given an individual, whose preferences 
are described by a particular decision theory, we construct a treatment where she faces 
relatively unattractive lotteries (higher likelihood of choosing a sure amount) and a treat-
ment where she faces relatively attractive lotteries (higher likelihood of choosing a risky 
lottery). By comparing behavioral patterns across two treatments, we test the predictions 
of decision theories without making any assumptions about their parametric forms. 
Natural experiments, provided by television shows, are often used in economic 
research to draw conclusions about various aspects of human behavior. Television shows 
provide an appealing material for economists, because these shows are often structured as 
strategic games and well-defined decision problems (Metrick, 1995). For example, 
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Bennett and Hickman (1993) and Berk, Hughson and Vandezande (1996) employ the 
natural laboratory of The Prize is Right to test for optimal information updating and 
rational bidding strategies correspondingly. Levitt (2004) and Antonovics, Arcidiancono 
and Walsh (2005) examine discrimination in The Weakest Link. Gertner (1993), Metrick 
(1995), and Beetsma and Schotman (2001) measure individual risk attitudes in the 
television shows Card Sharks, Jeopardy! and Lingo respectively.  
Due to its simple design and high monetary incentives, the television show Deal 
or No Deal has attracted economists as a perfect laboratory for studying individual 
decision making under risk. Post et al. (2004) analyze risk attitudes of Belgian, Dutch and 
German Deal or No Deal contestants. Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) elicit risk attitudes 
of Affari Tuoi contestants. Mulino et al. (2006) and de Roos and Sarafidis (2006) measure 
risk attitudes and study the endowment effect in the Australian version of Deal or No 
Deal. In contrast to this paper, all these studies conduct a parametric estimation of 
expected utility theory by assuming that all contestants exhibit constant relative or 
absolute risk aversion.4 In a separate paper, Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006), we study 
the decisions of Affari Tuoi contestants, when they can exchange two ex ante identical 
risky lotteries, and find that contestants do not appear to be predominantly loss averse. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the rules 
of the television show Affari Tuoi. Section 3 presents the data generated in this natural 
experiment and demographic characteristics of Affari Tuoi contestants. The predictions of 
ten well-known decision theories are tested in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
4 In addition to expected utility theory, several of these studies also consider one generalized non-expected 
utility theory. Post et al. (2004) estimate a parametric form of cumulative prospect theory with so-called 
Quiggin’s probability weighting function and an ad hoc reference point. Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) 
estimate a parametric form of (original) prospect theory with power probability weighting function and 
zero reference point. De Roos and Sarafidis (2006) estimate a parametric form of rank-dependent expected 
utility theory with power probability weighting function. 
  4
2. Description of the Television Show 
Affari Tuoi is the Italian version of the well-known Endemol television show Deal 
or No Deal. It is aired six days a week with an exception of Sunday on the first channel 
of Italian television RAI Uno. In order to become a contestant, interested candidates have 
to call a countrywide selection center. In other words, all contestants self-select into the 
show. According to Bombardini and Trebbi (2005), contestants are selected from the pool 
of interested candidates based on two criteria: entertaining appearance and income 
(wealthy candidates are discarded).  
Twenty contestants, all representing different administrative regions of Italy, 
participate in every television episode. Contestants are randomly assigned sealed boxes, 
numbered consecutively from 1 to 20. Each box contains one of twenty monetary prizes 
ranging from €0.01 to €500,000. The list of possible prizes is presented in Figure 1. An 
independent notary company allocates prizes across the boxes and seals the boxes.  
€0.01 €5,0005 
€0.2 €10,000 
€0.5 €15,000 
€1 €20,000 
€5 €25,000 
€10 €50,000 
€50 €75,000 
€100 €100,000 
€250 €250,000 
€500 €500,000 
Figure 1 A typical screenshot with a list of possible prizes  
at the beginning of the game 
Contestants know the list of potential prizes, that could be won during the game 
(i.e. Figure 1), but they do not know the content of each box. In every episode four small 
monetary prizes, ranging from €0.01 to €500, are substituted with token gifts, such as, for 
example, an orange instead of €0.20 or a puppy instead of €100. This substitution is done 
                                                 
5 Prize €5 000 was replaced with prize €30 000 starting from January 30, 2006 
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primarily for entertainment purposes and any contestant can reject a token gift and opt for 
its monetary equivalent.  
Every television episode consists of two phases – the selection phase and the 
game itself. During the selection phase, contestants receive one multiple-choice general 
knowledge question. The contestant, who is the first to answer this question correctly, is 
selected to play the game.6 During the game, the contestant keeps her own box and opens 
the remaining boxes one by one. Once a box is opened, the prize sealed inside is publicly 
revealed and deleted from the list of possible prizes shown on Figure 1. 
The more boxes the contestant opens, the more information she obtains about the 
distribution of possible prizes inside her own box. After opening several boxes the 
contestant receives an offer from the “bank”. This offer could be either a monetary price 
for the content of her box or the possibility to exchange her box for any of the remaining 
sealed boxes.7 Figure 2 shows the timing of “bank” offers.  
 “Bank” monetary offers are fairly predictable across the episodes and follow a 
general pattern. In the early stages of the game, they are smaller than the expected value 
of possible prizes. As the game progresses, the gap between the expected value and the 
monetary offer decreases and often disappears when there are two unopened boxes left. A 
detailed regression analysis of “bank” monetary offers is presented in the next subsection. 
The game terminates when either the contestant accepts the price offered by the “bank” 
or when all boxes are opened. In the latter case, the contestant leaves with the content of 
her box, which is opened last. 
                                                 
6 The remaining 19 contestants continue to participate in the next television episode. The contestant who 
was selected to play the game is replaced by a new contestant from the same region. The new contestant is 
selected from a pool of volunteers who called the selection center. 
7 Official rules of the show require the “bank” to offer exchange option at least once in every television 
episode. Therefore, the first offer that the “bank” makes is always the exchange offer. Before February 9, 
2006, the first offer was always made after the contestant opened six boxes. Starting from February 9, 
2006, the first offer was made after the contestant opened three boxes. 
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Figure 2 Timing of “bank” offers in television episodes before February 9, 2006 (left 
chart) and starting from February 9, 2006 (right chart) 
“Bank” offers a price or an exchange (if 
there are at least two unopened boxes)
Contestant opens 
three boxes 
“Bank” offers to exchange her own box 
for any of 16 remaining unopened boxes
Contestant opens 
three boxes 
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s 
box (14 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant 
accepts the price
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s 
box (11 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant 
accepts the price
Contestant opens 
three boxes
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s 
box (8 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant 
accepts the price
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s 
box (5 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant 
accepts the price
Contestant opens 
one box
Contestant 
accepts the price
Contestant opens 
one box 
Contestant opens 
six boxes 
“Bank” offers to exchange her own box 
for any of 13 remaining unopened boxes
Contestant opens 
three boxes 
“Bank” offers a price for contestant’s 
box (11 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant 
accepts the price 
“Bank” offers a price or an exchange  
(8 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant 
accepts the price 
Contestant opens 
three boxes
“Bank” offers a price or an exchange  
(5 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant opens 
three boxes
Contestant 
accepts the price 
“Bank” offers a price or an exchange  
(2 boxes remain unopened)
Contestant 
accepts the price 
Contestant opens 
two boxes
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3. Data 
The data, analyzed in this paper, were transcribed from original RAI Uno 
broadcasts of the television show Affari Tuoi from September 20, 2005 to March 4, 2006. 
The resulting natural laboratory contained 114 television episodes. Only one contestant 
played the game in every episode. This contestant had to decide on at least one exchange 
offer and at least one monetary offer.8 We recorded the distribution of all possible prizes 
that a contestant could potentially win at the moment when she made each decision as 
well as the prize sealed inside her own box (which was revealed only at the end of the 
show). 
In the beginning of each television episode, the contestant, who was selected to 
play the game, states her name, place of current residence, marital status and, less often, 
age and occupation. In our dataset, contestants from every Italian region played the game 
at least once (e.g. Figure 3). Representatives of Lombardia played the game most 
frequently (10 times), while a contestant from Campania played the game only once.  
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Figure 3 Regional distribution of contestants  
                                                 
8 In our recorded sample only one contestant accepted the first monetary offer from the “bank” (€18 000). 
Ten contestants accepted the second monetary offer that they received from the “bank”. 34 contestants 
accepted their third monetary offer. All remaining contestants received from 4 to 7 monetary offers. 
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According to their self-reported data, Affari Tuoi contestants greatly varied in 
their age. The youngest contestant in our sample was 23 and the oldest was 70 years old. 
In terms of the gender composition, the share of female contestants (54%) was slightly 
higher than that of male contestants (46%). 79% of all contestants were married, 14% – 
single, 5% – divorced and 2% – widowed. Therefore, the demographics, age and personal 
characteristics of Affari Tuoi contestants make them a more representative subject pool 
than standard pools, composed primarily of undergraduate students. Moreover, obtaining 
a similar dataset in conventional laboratory conditions would be a highly ambitious 
project, since it would require a budget of €3,364,852. 
Potentially, in Affari Tuoi any contestant can earn a maximum prize of €500,000. 
However, no contestant in our sample managed to win €500,000. The minimum prize 
earned in television episodes from September 20, 2005 to March 4, 2006 was €0.01 and 
the maximum prize was €250,000. The distribution of final earnings across the 114 
television episodes in our sample is shown on Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 The distribution of final earnings across 114 episodes 
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The average earnings of contestants were €29,516, with a median of €19,000 and 
a standard deviation of €42,120. Men earned on average €3,798 more than women. The 
standard deviation for final prizes, received by men, was €11,780 higher than that for 
final prizes that were won by women. While median earnings received by male 
contestants were €20,000, median earnings of females were €17,000. However, 
irrespective of the gender, average earnings in the show were significantly lower than the 
ex ante expected value of the prizes from Figure 1 (€52,295).  
Furthermore, average earnings were also lower than the average prize in the 
boxes, initially assigned to contestants who played the game. Figure 5 presents the 
distribution of monetary prizes in these boxes across 114 television episodes. This 
distribution is not significantly different from a uniform distribution (χ2 = 22.49, 
p=0.2605). On average, contestants were endowed with €41,279 and the median initial 
endowment was €250.  
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Figure 5 The distribution of initial endowments across 114 episodes 
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3.1. “Bank” monetary offers 
A precise mechanism of setting “bank” monetary offers is not revealed in show 
regulations. Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) suggest that offers in Affari Tuoi can be 
modeled as informative signals about the prize sealed inside a contestant’s box that the 
“bank” sends to the contestant. De Roos and Sarafidis (2006) conduct a regression 
analysis of “bank” offers in the Australian version of Deal or No Deal and find that the 
variability in “bank” offers is largely explained by the expected value of the remaining 
prizes but not by the prize hidden inside a contestant’s briefcase. Given these different 
models of “bank” offers suggested in the literature, we investigate the determinants of 
“bank” offers in our recorded sample. 
Table 1 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
εXXlnO 201 ++++= 2010 ... βββ  of 402 monetary amounts O  that the “bank” offered 
in exchange for risky lotteries in our recorded sample. Explanatory variables 201 XX ,...,  
consist of lottery specific variables (mean, median, and standard deviation of possible 
prizes etc.), socio-demographic characteristics of the contestants (gender, age, marital 
status and region) and treatment specific variables that are included to verify that the 
“bank” does not discriminate between different treatments that we consider in section 4. 
The second column of Table 1 demonstrates that around 85% of total variability 
in monetary offers is explained by the expected value and the number of possible prizes 
left. The “bank” makes higher offers when the number of possible prizes decreases, i.e. 
the game approaches the end. Regression coefficient on the standard deviation of possible 
prizes is also significant (the more dispersed are the prizes, the lower is the offer). 
However, regression coefficient of the prize hidden inside a contestant’s box is never 
statistically significant, i.e. there is no information content in the “bank” offers.  
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Description of explanatory variable Regression coefficient (standard error) 
Lottery specific variables:     
Constant -0.4982
* 
(0.2078) 
-0.7219***
(0.2085)
-0.6037* 
(0.2434) 
-0.697*  
(0.3426) 
Natural logarithm of expected value of 
possible prizes 
0.9956*** 
(0.0205) 
1.5026***
(0.1184) 
1.5036*** 
(0.1189) 
1.6057*** 
(0.1526) 
Natural logarithm of a median possible 
prize  
0.0132 
(0.0160) 
0.013 
(0.0161) 
0.0216  
(0.0192) 
Natural logarithm of standard deviation 
of possible prizes  
-0.5073***
(0.1055)
-0.5091*** 
(0.1058) 
-0.6087*** 
(0.1384) 
Natural logarithm of the prize hidden 
inside a contestant’s box  
0.0044 
(0.0063) 
0.0032 
(0.0064) 
0.0065  
(0.0065) 
Number of possible prizes in a lottery -0.0931
*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.051*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0515*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0221  
(0.0252) 
Individual specific variables:     
Gender dummy (0 – female, 1 – male)   0.0684 (0.0601) 
0.0395  
(0.0611) 
Self-reported age (in years) or estimate 
based on physical appearance   
-0.002 
(0.0027) 
-0.0021  
(0.0027) 
Marital status (0 – married, 1 – single, 
2 – divorced, and 3 – widowed)   
0.0324 
(0.0477) 
0.0383  
(0.479) 
Region dummy (0 for the region with 
the lowest income per capita (Calabria), 
19 for the highest (Lombardia) 
  -0.0044 (0.0050) 
-0.0073  
(0.0051) 
Treatment specific variables:     
Number of foregone prizes greater or 
equal to €5000 (in the last three boxes)    
-0.0351 
(0.0470) 
Number of foregone prizes that were 
among three highest ranked prizes    
-0.0509 
(0.0596) 
Dummy for group 1    0.2525* (0.1187)
Dummy for group 2    -0.193 (0.1053) 
Dummy for group 3    0.0645 (0.0959) 
Dummy for group 4    -0.0866 (0.0937)
Dummy for group 5    0.0586 (0.1016) 
Dummy for group 6    0.0601 (0.1013) 
Chances of €500 or less    0.06 (0.2158) 
Number of prizes less or equal to €5    -0.0596 (0.0395)
R2 0.8567 0.8693 0.8703 0.8752 
Adjuested R2 0.8560 0.8676 0.8673 0.8690 
* significant at 5% significance level 
*** significant at 0.1% significance level 
Table 1 OLS regression results for “bank” monetary offers (dependent variable—
natural logarithm of a price offered by the “bank”), N=402 
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4. Testing Predictions of Decision Theories  
The predictions of ten well-known decision theories are tested in the natural 
experiment provided by the television show Affari Tuoi. We selected a typical menu of 
decision theories that are usually considered in existing studies that investigate which 
model of risky choice describes best the behavioral patterns observed in the conventional 
laboratory experiments (e.g. Table 2). Since every Affari Tuoi contestant makes only few 
observed choice decisions, we use a between-subject design to test the predictions of the 
selected decision theories (except for risk neutrality and the assumption of loss aversion 
of prospect theory that can be tested for every contestant). This paper follows a non-
parametric approach, i.e. we do not make any assumptions about specific functional 
forms for utility functions, probability weighting functions etc. 
Investigated in experimental study? 
Decision theory Camerer 
(1989) 
Starmer 
(1992)9 
Harless &
Camerer 
(1994)9 
Hey and 
Orme 
(1994) 10 
Hey 
(2001) 
Risk Neutrality   D D D 
Expected Utility Theory D D D D D 
Weighted Utility Theory D D D D D 
Skew-Symmetric Bilinear Utility D D D   
(Cumulative) Prospect Theory D D D   
Regret Theory    D  
Rank-Dependent Expected Utility D D D D D 
Yaari’s Dual Model   D D  
Prospective Reference Theory    D D 
Disappointment Aversion Theory   D D D 
Table 2 Decision theories investigated in the existing laboratory experiments 
                                                 
9 Similar to our study, Starmer (1992) and Harless & Camerer (1994) tested fanning out hypothesis of 
weighted utility and skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory.  
10 Hey and Orme (1994) also considered the quadratic utility model of Chew et al. (1991) that is derived 
from a mixture symmetry axiom. However, there appears to be no testable implication of this theory in the 
context of this natural experiment.  
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4.1. Risk Neutrality 
Risk neutrality is arguably the simplest decision theory. A risk neutral individual 
always prefers the lottery with the highest expected value of possible outcomes. 
Formally, an individual chooses a risky lottery ( )nxnxL n 1,;...;1,1  that delivers outcome 
ix , { }ni ,...,1∈ , with probability n1  over a sure amount y  if yxn
n
i
i ≥∑
=1
1 . 
In our sample of 114 Affari Tuoi episodes the “bank” made 402 monetary offers. 
Only two monetary offers exceeded the expected value of the prizes that a contestant was 
still able to win when the offer was made (one of these offers was accepted and one was 
rejected).11 Nine monetary offers were exactly equal to the expected value of possible 
prizes (4 were accepted and 5 were rejected). The overwhelming majority (391) of 
“bank” monetary offers was below the expected value of possible prizes (62 of these 
offers were accepted and 329 were rejected).12 Thus, 63 Affari Tuoi contestants (55.3%) 
violated the assumption of risk neutrality, i.e. 62 contestants accepted “bank” offers 
lower than the expected value and 1 contestant rejected a “bank” offer higher than the 
expected value. 
4.2. Expected Utility Theory 
According to expected utility theory, an individual evaluates monetary outcomes 
by means of a subjective utility function and chooses the lottery with the highest expected 
utility of possible outcomes. Formally, an individual chooses a risky lottery 
                                                 
11 It appears that these two more than actuarially fair offers resulted from rounding of “bank” offers and 
they do not reflect a systematic policy of the “bank” to make occasional “kind” offers. On one occasion, the 
“bank” offered €40 when the expected value of three remaining prizes was €36.83 and on the second 
occasion the “bank” offered €17 000 when the expected value of eight remaining prizes was €16 300. 
12 Due to rounding of “bank” offers, several offers were just few pennies below the expected value of 
outstanding prizes. For example, seven offers were less than 1% below the expected value of possible 
prizes and the contestants rejected six of these offers. Thus, a large number of accepted less than actuarially 
fair offers cannot be explained by the fact that some of these offers were just marginally lower than the 
expected value of possible prizes. 
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( )nxnxL n 1,;...;1,1  over a sure amount y  if ( ) ( )yuxun
n
i
i ≥∑
=1
1 , where RR: →u  is a 
(Bernoulli) utility function over money. The utility function can be normalized without 
loss of generality for two outcomes, e.g. ( ) 0€01.0 =u  and ( ) 1€500000 =u . 
Before February 9, 2006 every Affari Tuoi contestant received up to 4 monetary 
offers for a distribution of up to 11 possible prizes. Starting from February 9, 2006 Affari 
Tuoi contestants receive up to 7 monetary offers and the first offer is made for a 
distribution of 14 possible prizes. Obviously, a non-parametric test of expected utility 
theory is not feasible on Affari Tuoi data because every contestant makes only few 
observed decisions but faces lotteries with many outcomes.13 Therefore, instead of testing 
the prediction of expected utility theory, we look for patterns in the data that are difficult 
to reconcile within the expected utility framework. 
Expected utility maximizers take into account only the distribution of possible 
prizes, the current offer and the expectation of future “bank” offers. Thus, their decisions 
are not influenced by monetary prizes that were already eliminated from the list of 
possible prizes. However, Post et al. (2004) find that Deal or No Deal contestants from 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands tend to exhibit a lower coefficient of relative risk 
aversion after the elimination of large prizes.14 Given this finding, we test if Affari Tuoi 
contestants, who experienced recent elimination of large prizes, reject “bank” offers more 
often. 
                                                 
13 For every contestant, there are at most only 7 weak inequalities restricting individual utility function and 
at least 9 outcomes, utility of which can be freely chosen (given that utility of two outcomes is normalized). 
14 Notice that this finding does not necessarily contradict to the expected utility theory. It rather shows that 
subjective utility function does not exhibit a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion. Instances, when a 
contestant rejects a more than actuarially fair offer only to accept later a less than actuarially fair offer, also 
do not necessarily contradict to the expected utility theory if utility function is concave over one range of 
outcomes and convex over another (e.g. Markowitz, 1952). 
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Since the “bank” typically makes the next monetary offer after a contestant opens 
another three boxes, we consider if contestants’ decision to accept or reject the offer 
depends on the number of large prizes that were discovered in the last three boxes opened 
prior to the  decision. We define a large prize both in absolute terms (any prize higher or 
equal to €5000 15) and in relative terms (three largest prizes in the distribution of possible 
prizes that the contestant faced before opening three boxes). Table 1 shows that “bank” 
monetary offers do not depend on the number of foregone large prizes, for large prizes in 
both absolute and relative terms. Table 3 shows how many Affari Tuoi contestants 
accepted and rejected “bank” monetary offers in both cases. 
Number (percentage) of 
contestants who … 
Number (percentage) of 
contestants who … 
Number of 
foregone 
large prizes Accept offer Reject offer
Number of 
foregone 
large prizes Accept offer Reject offer
0 6 (15.00%) 34 (85.00%) 0 10 (8.06%) 114 (91.94%)
1 30 (16.39%) 153 (83.61%) 1 35 (18.04%) 159 (81.96%)
2 24 (16.67%) 120 (83.33%) 2 21 (26.92%) 57 (73.08%)
3 7 (20.00%) 28 (80.00%)
 
3 1 (16.67%) 5 (83.33%) 
Table 3 Decisions of contestants depending on the number of large prizes discovered 
in the last three opened boxes. Large prizes are defined as prizes greater or equal to 
€5000 (left table) or three highest ranked prizes (right table). 
For large prizes in absolute terms, the acceptance rate for “bank” offers does not 
depend on the number of foregone large prizes. For large prizes in relative terms, there is 
a significant difference in acceptance rates only between contestants who were lucky not 
to eliminate any of large prizes and contestants who eliminated two of the three highest 
ranked prizes when opening the last three boxes.16 Thus, there appears to be no evidence 
of path-dependence i.e. contestants’ decisions being influenced by a foregone history. 
                                                 
15 Figure 1 offers a natural threshold for distinguishing between large and small prizes. All prizes that are 
above or equal to €5 000 are significantly (at least 10 times) higher than all prizes below €5 000. 
16 Interestingly, Affari Tuoi contestants who eliminated several large prizes tend to accept “bank” offers 
more often than contestants who did not eliminate any of large prizes, which is the opposite of the effect 
reported in Post et al. (2004). 
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4.3. Fanning-Out (Weighted Utility Theory, Transitive 
Skew-Symmetric Bilinear Utility Theory) 
Machina (1982) proposed the fanning-out hypothesis that individuals do not 
become less risk averse when lotteries improve in the sense of the first-order stochastic 
dominance. Several decision theories such as weighted utility theory (e.g. Chew and 
McCrimmon, 1979, Chew, 1983) and transitive skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory 
(e.g. Fishburn, 1983, 1988) incorporate the fanning-out hypothesis by restricting their 
general utility functionals to explain well-know violations of the expected utility theory 
such as the Allais paradox (e.g. Allais, 1953) or common ratio effect (e.g. Starmer, 2000). 
To test the fanning-out hypothesis, we consider all Affari Tuoi contestants who 
received a monetary offer for a distribution of eight, five and two possible prizes17. In 
each of these three cases, we select a separating lottery and compare the acceptance 
(rejection) rate for “bank” offers in two groups of contestants. In the first group, 
contestants face a distribution of possible prizes, which is stochastically dominated by the 
separating lottery. In the second group, contestants face a distribution of possible prizes, 
which stochastically dominates the separating lottery. The separating lottery is selected to 
maximize the minimum number of observations in two groups18.  
Contestants are allocated across the two groups at random (as a result of chance 
events). Table 1 shows that the “bank” does make higher offers to contestants in group 2. 
                                                 
17 We do not consider contestants’ decisions on monetary offers for a distribution of eleven possible prizes 
because such offer was accepted only by one contestant in our recorded sample. 
18 We obtained a separating lottery ( )21,;21, ba , €50€10 << a  and €25000€20000 << b  for 
contestants who faced a distribution of two possible prizes, a separating lottery ( )51,;51,;51,;51,;51, edcba , €1€5.0 << a , €100€50 << b , €5000€500 << c , 
€25000€20000 << d  and €250000€100000 << e  for contestants who faced a distribution of 
five possible prizes, and a separating lottery ( )81,;81,;81,;81,;81,;81,;81,;81, hgfedcba , 
€2.0€01.0 << a , €5€1 << b , €100€50 << c , €500€250 << d , €10000€5000 << e , 
€20000€15000 << f , €75000€50000 << g  and €500000€250000 << h  for contestants 
who faced a distribution of eight possible prizes. 
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In fact, at 5% significance level we cannot reject the hypothesis that the “bank” makes 
higher offers to group 1. This allows us to formulate our testing hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis I Contestants in both groups accept “bank” offers equally often. 
Hypothesis II (fanning out) Contestants in the second group accept monetary 
offers from the “bank” more often than contestants in the first group. 
Contestants facing a 
distribution of 8 prizes 
Contestants facing a 
distribution of 5 prizes
Contestants facing a 
distribution of 2 prizes
 YES NO  YES NO  YES NO 
G1 1 12 G1 3 16 G1 2 11 
G2 3 12 G2 10 9 G2 7 6 
 N=28  N=38  N=26 
Fisher’s exact test 
(one sided) p=0.3831 
 
Fisher’s exact test 
(one sided) p=0.0191 
 
Fisher’s exact test 
(one sided) p=0.0484 
Table 4 Number of contestants accepting (“YES”) and rejecting (“NO”) “bank” 
offers in group 1 (G1) and group 2 (G2). All contestants in G2 face distributions that 
stochastically dominate distributions faced by contestants in G1. 
Table 4 shows that the fraction of contestants who accept “bank” offers is always 
higher in the second group than in the first group. This difference is also statistically 
significant for contestants who face a distribution of five and two possible prizes. Thus, 
the data from our natural experiment strongly support the fanning-out hypothesis. 
Although this finding may cast doubt on the descriptive validity of expected utility 
theory, it does not necessarily contradict the expected utility framework. The reason is 
that contestants in groups 1 and 2 generally faced lotteries over different monetary prizes. 
Thus, expected utility maximizers with convex (or linear) utility function over small 
outcomes and concave utility function over large outcomes may also exhibit this type of 
fanning-out. Note that evidence of fanning-out that invalidates expected utility theory 
comes from conventional laboratory experiments where subjects face lotteries over the 
same outcomes (usually, three-outcome lotteries located inside the probability triangle). 
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4.4. (Cumulative) Prospect Theory 
According to prospect theory, an individual obtains a simplified representation of 
a decision problem in the editing phase and subsequently evaluates edited lotteries in the 
evaluation phase (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Two editing operations that are 
relevant in the context of this experiment are simplification (monetary outcomes are 
rounded up) and combination (probabilities associated with identical outcomes are added 
together). In the evaluation phase, edited lotteries are evaluates by means of an S-shaped 
value function and inverse-S shaped probability weighting function.  
The value function satisfies the assumption of loss aversion—individuals derive a 
higher disutility from losses than utility from equal-sized gains. Gains and losses are 
measured relative to the reference point that “usually corresponds to the current asset 
position” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The probability weighting function overvalues 
small probabilities and undervalues medium and high probabilities. Note that in 
cumulative prospect theory (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) this effect holds only for 
extreme outcomes (highest ranked and lowest ranked gains and losses). We will test the 
rank-dependent nonlinear probability weighting in section 4.6 below. 
A rather natural implication of the editing phase in the contest of this natural 
experiment is that Affari Tuoi contestants round up numerous small outcomes in the left 
section of Figure 1 and combine their probabilities in one joint probability.19 This joint 
probability is overweighted, if small, and underweighted otherwise. Thus, prospect theory 
predicts that Affari Tuoi contestants facing a low chance of receiving a small prize 
(≤€500) are likely to accept “bank” offers more frequently than the contestants facing a 
high chance of ending up with €500 or less. 
                                                 
19 Figure 1 also shows that prizes are framed in a way that encourages such editing. All small prizes in the 
left section are highlighted in one color (blue). 
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Monetary offers for a distribution of 
eight possible prizes 
 Monetary offers for a distribution of 
five possible prizes 
Number (percentage) of 
contestants who … 
Number (percentage) of 
contestants who … Chance of €500 or less 
Accept offer Reject offer
Chance of 
€500 or less
Accept offer Reject offer
1/4 2 (28.57%) 5  (71.43%) 0 1  (33.33%) 2  (66.67%) 
3/8 1   (2.63%) 37 (97.37%) 1/5 7  (35.00%) 13 (65.00%)
1/2 4 (12.12%) 29 (87.88%) 2/5 10 (35.71%) 18 (64.29%)
5/8 3 (11.54%) 23 (88.46%) 3/5 12 (37.50%) 20 (62.50%)
3/4 0   (0.00%) 3 (100.00%)
 
4/5 4  (30.77%) 9  (69.23%) 
Table 5 Decisions of contestants and the chance of receiving a small prize (≤€500)  
To test this prediction of prospect theory, we consider the decisions of Affari Tuoi 
contestants who received an offer for a distribution of eight and five possible prizes.20 
Table 5 shows no evidence that low chances of a small prize are overweighted (leading to 
a higher acceptance rate) and high chances of a small prize are underweighted (leading to 
a lower acceptance rate).21 Only contestants who face a ¼ chance of receiving €500 or 
less are marginally more likely to accept “bank” offers than contestants who face a 
corresponding chance of 3/8 (one sided Fisher’s exact test p= 0.0587). 
Natural laboratory of Affari Tuoi can be also used for testing the assumption of 
loss aversion of prospect theory by considering the decisions of contestants who received 
an exchange offer. Particularly, Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006) show that loss averse 
contestants should always reject the exchange offer and keep the box that they are 
endowed with. However, 46% of all contestants violated the assumption of loss aversion 
(39% accepted the first exchange offer and 7% rejected the first exchange offer but 
accepted the second exchange offer). 
                                                 
20 We do not consider the decisions of contestants who received a monetary offer for a distribution of 
eleven and two prizes because there is no sufficient variability of the data in the first case (only one 
contestant accepted a monetary offer for a distribution of eleven prizes) and contestants do not face 
outcomes of low probability in the second case. 
21 Similar results hold when only the probabilities of prizes below or equal to €250, €100 etc. are combined. 
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4.5. Regret Theory (Non-Transitive Skew-Symmetric 
Bilinear Utility Theory) 
According to regret theory, an individual experiences regret (rejoicing) when a 
lottery that she has chosen delivers lower (higher) outcome than the ex post outcome of 
the lottery that she did not choose. Ex ante, an individual anticipates future regret or 
rejoicing and attempts to minimize ex post regret (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1987). 
Formally, an individual chooses a risky lottery ( )nxnxL n 1,;...;1,1  over a sure amount y  
if ( ) 0,
1
≥∑
=
n
i
i yxψ , where ( )⋅⋅,ψ  is a skew-symmetric function satisfying the assumption 
of regret aversion: ( ) ( ) ( )cbbaca ,,, ψψψ +> , cba >>∀  (e.g. Loomes et al., 1992). 
Since contestants always choose between one risky and one degenerate lottery, i.e. 
between two statistically independent lotteries, regret theory also coincides with (non-
transitive) skew-symmetric bilinear utility theory (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1987). 
To test the prediction of regret theory, we consider all decisions of Affari Tuoi 
contestants when they reject a monetary offer from the “bank” (335 cases), when they 
accept a monetary offer for a distribution of two possible prizes (18 cases) and when they 
receive an offer to exchange their box for the only one remaining sealed box (23 cases). 
In all these cases it is easy to establish the outcome that a contestant would have 
experienced, if she had changed her decision.22 We consider the difference between final 
earnings of Affari Tuoi contestants and the outcome that they would have received if they 
had reached a different decision in 376 cases described above. A positive difference 
signifies rejoicing and a negative difference denotes regret.  
                                                 
22 We do not consider the decisions of contestants to accept a monetary offer from the “bank”, when more 
than two boxes remain unopened (49 cases), and the decisions of contestants when they receive exchange 
offer and more than two boxes remain unopened (125 cases). In these cases it is impossible to establish 
with certainty what outcome a contestant would have experienced, had she changed her decision. 
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If the assumption of regret aversion holds, instances of ex post regret are likely to 
be infrequent and/or of a smaller absolute magnitude compared to the instances of ex post 
rejoicing. Affari Tuoi contestants indeed experienced regret only in 146 cases (38.8%) 
compared to 211 cases (56.1%) of rejoicing.23 Moreover, there are only few instances of 
a large regret and numerous cases of a large rejoicing.24 Figure 6 shows that cumulative 
distribution function of ex post rejoicing clearly (first order) stochastically dominates 
cumulative distribution function of ex post regret. Thus, Affari Tuoi contestants are quite 
successful in avoiding ex post regret, which is consistent with the assumption of regret 
aversion (convexity of a skew-symmetric utility function). 
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Figure 6 Cumulative distribution function of ex post regret (absolute amount) and 
ex post rejoicing. Vertical axis shows the probability that an Affari Tuoi contestant 
regretted for or rejoiced in an amount not higher than shown on the horizontal axis. 
                                                 
23 In 19 cases (5.1%) there was no regret and no rejoicing. 
24 For example, there are only 3 cases when contestants regretted loosing more than 75 000 Euro (including 
one instance of a dramatic regret when a contestant could have won 400 000 Euro more) and 29 cases when 
contestants rejoiced gaining more than 75 000 Euro. 
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4.6. Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory 
According to rank-dependent expected utility theory, an individual chooses a 
risky lottery ( )nxnxL n 1,;...;1,1 , nxxx >>> ...21 , over a sure amount y  if 
( ) ( )yuxu
n
iw
n
iw
n
i
i ≥⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∑
=1
1 , where [ ] [ ]1,01,0: →w  is a probability weighting 
function and RR: →u  is utility function (e.g. Quiggin, 1982). The probability 
weighting function is strictly increasing and satisfies boundary conditions ( ) 00 =w  and 
( ) 11 =w . Additionally, this function has a characteristic inverse-S shape—it is concave 
for low probabilities ( 31<p ) and convex for medium and high probabilities 
( 31>p ).When all lottery outcomes nxxx >>> ...21  are above the reference point of an 
individual, the prediction of rank-dependent expected utility theory is identical to the 
prediction of cumulative prospect theory (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
The inverse-S shape of the probability weighting function implies that individuals 
overvalue small probabilities of extreme outcomes (i.e. highest ranked and lowest ranked 
outcomes) and undervalue medium and high probabilities of extreme outcomes. Consider 
an individual facing a risky lottery that delivers the highest possible outcome with a small 
probability and this outcome is significantly higher (in terms of utility) than the second 
highest possible outcome of a lottery. Rank-dependent expected utility theory predicts 
that the individual overvalues such a lottery, i.e. she is likely to exhibit risk-seeking 
behavior. Similarly, the individual undervalues a risky lottery that yields the lowest 
possible outcome with a small probability if this outcome is significantly lower (in terms 
of utility) than the second lowest possible outcome of a lottery. In this case an individual 
is more likely to exhibit risk-averse behavior. 
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To test the predictions of rank-dependent expected utility theory, we consider the 
decisions of Affari Tuoi contestants who received a monetary offer for a distribution of 
eight and five possible prizes.25 These contestants face risky lotteries that yield every 
possible prize with probability 0.2 and 0.125, respectively. We consider the 
acceptance/rejection rate for “bank” monetary offers across four groups of contestants. 
Contestants are divided across four groups depending on the risky lottery that they face: 
Group 3 The highest possible prize of a lottery is at least ten times higher than the 
second highest prize of the lottery. 
Group 4 The two highest possible prizes of a lottery are adjacent prizes (e.g. in Figure 
1). If the lottery has eight possible prizes, the three highest ranked prizes are adjacent. 
Group 5 The second lowest possible prize of a lottery is at least ten times higher than the 
lowest prize of the lottery. 
Group 6 The two lowest possible prizes of a lottery are adjacent prizes (e.g. in Figure 1). 
If the lottery has eight possible prizes, the three lowest ranked prizes are adjacent.26 
Table 1 shows that the “bank” does not discriminate between members of groups 
3-6 when making monetary offers. Rank-dependent expected utility theory then predicts 
that “bank” offers are rejected more frequently in group 3 than in group 4. Probability of 
receiving a large prize is 20% or 12.5% in group 3 and 40% or 37.5% in group 4. This  
probability is overweighed to a stronger extent in group 3 than in group 4, 27 leading to a 
higher rejection of “bank” offers.  Similarly, rank-dependent expected utility theory 
predicts that “bank” offers are accepted more frequently in group 5 than in group 6. 
                                                 
25 See footnote 20. 
26 For identification of groups 5 and 6, prizes €0.01, €0.20, €0.50, €1 and €5 are treated as identical.  
27 For example a 1/5 chance of a large prize 1x  is valued as ( ) ( )151 xuw ⋅ , which can be higher than utility of 
an actuarially fair offer ( )51xu  if ( ) 5151 >w . However a 1/5 chance of 1x  and a 1/5 chance of a similar 
large prize 12 xx < , ( ) ( )12 xuxu ≈ , is valued as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )121 52515251 xuwxuwwxuw ⋅≈⋅−+⋅ , which is 
likely to be lower than utility of an actuarially fair offer ( )( )521 xxu +  if ( ) 5252 ≤w . 
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Monetary offers for a distribution of 
eight possible prizes: 
Monetary offers for a distribution of 
five possible prizes: 
 Accepted Rejected  Accepted Rejected 
Group 3 1 11 Group 3 14 20 
Group 4 0 14 Group 4 7 17 
Fisher’s exact test (one sided) p=0.9999 Fisher’s exact test (one sided) p=0.8883
 Accepted Rejected  Accepted Rejected 
Group 5 2 16 Group 5 15 27 
Group 6 4 49 Group 6 19 35 
Fisher’s exact test (one sided) p=0.4790
 
Fisher’s exact test (one sided) p=0.5629
Table 6 Number of monetary offers for a distribution of five/eight possible prizes 
that were accepted/rejected in groups 3-6. 
Table 6 shows that there is no systematic difference in acceptance/rejection of 
“bank” monetary offers across groups 3 and 4 and across groups 5 and 6. Thus, the 
decisions of Affari Tuoi contestants do not reveal any manifestable effect of nonlinear 
probability weighting. 
4.7. Yaari’s Dual Model 
According to Yaari’s model, an individual chooses lottery ( )nxnxL n 1,;...;1,1 , 
nxxx >>> ...21 , over amount y  for certain if yxn
iw
n
iw
n
i
i ≥⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∑
=1
1 , where 
[ ] [ ]1,01,0: →w  is a probability weighting function (e.g. Yaari, 1987). The probability 
weighting function is strictly increasing and ( ) 00 =w , ( ) 11 =w . Note that this model is a 
special case of rank-dependent expected utility theory where the utility function is linear. 
To test Yaari’s dual model, we consider the decisions of Affari Tuoi contestants 
who receive monetary offer y  for a 50%-50% chance to win either prize 1x  or prize 2x . 
According to Yaari’s model, contestants reject “bank” offer if ( ) ( ) yxxwx ≥−⋅+ 212 21 , 
which is equivalent to ( ) ( ) ( )21221 xxxyw −−≥ . Thus, the higher is the ratio 
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( ) ( )212 xxxyz −−= , the more likely is a contestant to accept a “bank” offer (for a given 
probability weight ( )21w ). 
For 41 Affari Tuoi contestants who received a monetary offer for a distribution of 
two prizes, a simple logit regression ( ) ( ) ( )( )zz 1010 exp1expPr ββββ +++="accept"  
yields an estimate of regression coefficients, with standard errors in parenthesis, of 
(0.2243)  0.2448 0 =β  and (0.5782)  0.5346 1 =β . Thus, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the ratio ( ) ( )212 xxxyz −−=  and the likelihood that contestants 
accept “bank” offers. Apparently, Affari Tuoi contestants facing a decision problem with 
high ratio z , are also more likely to possess a higher probability weight ( )21w . It is 
difficult to reconcile this finding within the framework of Yaari’s dual model, because 
probability weights are assumed to be independent of the monetary outcomes. 
4.8. Prospective Reference Theory 
According to prospective reference theory, an individual maximizes a weighted 
average of the expected utility of a lottery and the expected utility from receiving every 
possible outcome of the lottery with equal probability (Viscusi, 1989). Formally, an 
individual chooses risky lottery ( )nxnxL n 1,;...;1,1 , over amount y  for certain if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )yuxu
n
xu
n
xu
n
n
i
i
n
i
i
n
i
i ≥=−+ ∑∑∑
=== 111
1111 λλ , where RR: →u  is a (Bernoulli) 
utility function over money and [ ]1,0∈λ  is the weight of the relative information content. 
Affari Tuoi television show employs only lotteries with equiprobable outcomes. Thus, in 
our dataset the prediction of prospective reference theory is identical to the prediction of 
expected utility theory (for any possible weight of the relative information content). 
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4.9. Disappointment Aversion Theory 
According to disappointment aversion theory, an individual experiences 
disappointment (elation) when a realized outcome of a lottery is below (above) its 
certainty equivalent. Ex ante, an individual anticipates future disappointment or elation 
and attempts to minimize ex post disappointment (Gul, 1991). Formally, an individual 
chooses a risky lottery ( )nxnxL n 1,;...;1,1 , nxxx >>> ...21 , over a sure amount y  if 
( ) ( ) ( )yuxu
nm
xu
nm
n
mni
i
mn
i
i ≥+
+++ ∑∑ +−=
−
= 11
1
1
11
1
1
β
β
β , where { }1,...,1 −∈ nm  is a number of 
disappointing outcomes in lottery L , 0≥β  is a subjective parameter that captures 
disappointment averse preferences and RR: →u  is a (Bernoulli) utility function. 
To test the prediction of disappointment aversion theory, we analyze the decisions 
of Affari Tuoi contestants who received a monetary offer for a distribution of eight, five 
and two prizes. Consider the five lowest prizes from Figure 1 (€0.01, €0.20, €0.50, €1 
and €5). Given that the other prizes from Figure 1 are significantly higher monetary 
amounts, we assume, for simplicity, that these five lowest prizes yield the same utility. 
Without loss of generality, this utility can be normalized to zero. In our recorded sample, 
prizes €0.01, €0.20, €0.50, €1 and €5 are always disappointing prizes.28 An individual 
then chooses a risky lottery L  over monetary amount y  for certain if 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )yuxunkmxunkm
kn
mni
i
mn
i
i ≥++
++++ ∑∑
−
+−=
−
= 11
1
1
11
1
1
β
β
β , where { }5,...,1∈k  is the number 
of prizes of lottery L  that are below or equal to €5 and m  is the number of disappointing 
                                                 
28 When contestants receive a monetary offer for a distribution of eight (five) equiprobable prizes, at least 
two (one) of these prizes are (is) at least 1000 times higher than €5. Thus, for any plausible level of risk 
aversion, the certainty equivalent of such lotteries is significantly above €5 i.e. outcomes €0.01, €0.20, 
€0.50, €1 and €5 are disappointing outcomes. When contestants receive a monetary offer for a distribution 
of two prizes, one of which is below or equal to €5, the low prize is obviously a disappointing prize. In our 
recorded sample there are also two instances when a contestant received a monetary offer for lotteries 
(€1,0.5;€0.50,0.5) and (€1,0.5;€0.20,0.5). We excluded these two cases from current analysis. 
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prizes of lottery L  that are higher than €5. Thus, according to disappointment aversion 
theory, the higher is k , the more likely is a contestant to accept “bank” offer.  
Contrary to the theoretical prediction, Table 7 shows that Affari Tuoi contestants 
tend to accept “bank” offers less frequently when they face lotteries with a high number 
of small disappointing prizes. However, this tendency is not statistically significant. 
Thus, Affari Tuoi contestants do not appear to be averse to small disappointing prizes. 
The presence of such prizes rather induces a risk-seeking behavior.  
Number of contestants who face a lottery with… 
  8 prizes and… 5 prizes and… 2 prizes and… 
Number of 
small (≤€5)    
disappointing 
prizes  
Accept 
offer 
Reject 
offer 
Accept 
offer 
Reject 
offer 
Accept 
offer 
Reject 
offer 
0 1 5 12 10 12 12 
1 4 27 12 28 6 9 
2 5 37 9 19 
3 1 27 1 4 
4 0 4 0 1 
Table 7 Decisions of contestants and the number of small disappointing prizes in a 
risky lottery 
5. Conclusion  
The television show Affari Tuoi provides an interesting natural experiment that 
allows to test the predictions of different decision theories. Contestants representing the 
adult population of Italy face a sequence of binary choices between a risky lottery with 
equiprobable prizes and a monetary amount for certain. The show provides very high real 
incentives with prizes ranging from one cent to half a million euros. This allows us to 
investigate decision making in a domain that is not feasible in conventional laboratory 
experiments. However, we observe only few choices made by each contestant, which 
mostly restricts our analysis to a between-subject design. Random events play a crucial 
role in this natural experiment, because they determine the distribution of possible prizes 
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that a contestant is facing. This enables us to allocate contestants across randomized 
treatments.  
We test the predictions of ten well-known decision theories that are usually 
contested against each other for the best explanation of behavioral patterns observed in 
laboratory experiments. The main findings of this natural experiment can be summarized 
as follows. On the one hand, Affari Tuoi contestants clearly violate the assumption of risk 
neutrality and the assumption of loss aversion of prospect theory. On the other hand, the 
behavior of Affari Tuoi contestants supports the assumption of regret aversion of regret 
theory and fanning-out hypothesis of weighted utility and skew-symmetric bilinear utility 
theories. Predictions of other theories are neither supported nor rejected (e.g. simple or 
rank-dependent non-linear probability weighting and disappointment aversion). 
It is important to emphasize that none of contestants actually violated expected 
utility theory or any of the generalized non-expected utility theories that incorporate the 
former as a special case. However, contestants managed to avoid ex post regret, which is 
difficult to reconcile with any other decision theory but regret theory, and revealed 
significantly higher risk aversion when facing stochastically dominating lotteries, which 
is predicted by decision theories that incorporate the fanning-out hypothesis. Obviously, 
these results have important implications for future theoretical work.  
In contrast to numerous laboratory experiments that document non-linear 
probability weighting, our natural experiment provides no support for this phenomenon. 
This somewhat surprising lack of evidence suggests that more empirical work has to be 
done outside the laboratory. Currently, we plan to extend our analysis to incorporate the 
Deal or No Deal shows broadcasted in Switzerland and the U.S., where contestants make 
similar decisions as in Affari Tuoi.  
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